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• In its Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission has rightly noted the
importance of reducing the price paid for basic cross-border parcel delivery by
consumers and by small and medium size retail senders.
• The payment flows for cross-border parcel delivery are strikingly similar to those for
telecommunications. Comparisons with roaming can be instructive. As with roaming,
it is clear that the links between wholesale payments between the national postal
operators and retail prices need to be properly understood in order to craft good policy.
Another useful lesson is that national postal regulatory authorities are unlikely to
address cross-border problems because of limitations in their respective mandates
and because they have no incentive to take measures to benefit residents of other
countries.
• There are also significant differences between roaming and parcel delivery. While high
wholesale charges were a major driver of high retail prices for international mobile
roaming, the wholesale payments for cross-border parcel delivery appear to be below
cost. This implies that it is the ‘spread’ between retail price and the wholesale payment
that is inflated, at least for small retail senders and for consumers.
• Comprehensive statistics gathering, coordinated at European level, is indispensable.
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1. FTI (2011); study
completed for the
European Commission
(DG Enterprise).
2. See FTI (2011):
“[S]mall senders (individu-
als, micro and small enter-
prises) ... either pay full
price (as published in the
publicly available price list
of the delivery operator), or
obtain small discounts on
both domestic and cross-
border products ...”.
3.EurActiv and Digital
Europe (2016). See also
European Commission
(2015): “While 17 percent
of SMEs in the EU sell online
(which is already very low),
only 7 percent sell
cross-border to other EU
countries”.
1  INTRODUCTION
The expansion of e-commerce represents a sub-
stantial growth opportunity for Europe. The ability
of Europe to fully capitalise on this opportunity
appears however to be limited by the high prices
paid for the shipment of goods across national
boundaries within the European Union. In its Digi-
tal Single Market (DSM) strategy (European Com-
mission, 2015) and elsewhere, the European
Commission has repeatedly signalled its intent to
reduce cross-border parcel delivery prices and to
increase the transparency of retail pricing for
cross-border delivery services, an initiative that
we consider to be on target.
In this, our concern is with basic cross-border
delivery services, not with express or courier
services; our primary focus is on business-to-con-
sumer (B2C) shipments rather than business-to-
business (B2B); and the concern is far greater for
shipments by consumers, micro-enterprises, and
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) than for
large-scale senders. Our focus is on the national
postal operators (NPOs), who continue to play a
major role in these cross-border shipments. This
has also been the Commission’s central focus in
its DSM initiative.
1.1 Cross-border e-commerce is a growth
opportunity for the EU
Online purchasing is growing rapidly within the
European Union, as elsewhere, generating bene-
fits for broader European society. The European
Commission (2015) reported that online sale of
goods in the EU was increasing “at an average
annual growth rate of 22 percent, surpassing €200
billion in 2014 and reaching a share of 7 percent of
total retail sales”. Of particular interest are busi-
ness-to-consumer (B2C) activities. In 2012, B2C e
commerce in the EU28 (reflecting the sum of
goods and services purchased online) grew by 18
percent to reach €276.5 billion (Brune, 2013).
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Cross-border purchasing is also growing in terms
of the revenues generated and in terms of the
number of consumers who order across borders.
Eurostat data confirms that 65 percent of Internet
users shopped online in 2015, and that “… 30
percent of online shoppers bought or ordered
goods or services from sellers in other EU coun-
tries. … A rising trend is observed for purchases
from sellers in other member states (from 25 per-
cent in 2012 to 30 percent in 2015) and from sell-
ers outside the EU (from 13 percent in 2012 to 18
percent in 2015)” (Eurostat, 2016). FTI Consult-
ing in 2011 had already found that “distance sales
and e commerce represent 7 percent and 5 per-
cent of [EU] retail turnover [respectively], a mere
1 percent of which is generated cross-border for
each activity”1.
Parcel delivery clearly facilitates this e-commerce.
Of the €477 billion in e-commerce purchases in
Europe in 2015, 53 percent was purchases of
goods, 47 percent was purchases of services (E-
commerce Europe, 2015). The goods clearly had
to be delivered somehow.
The role of micro-, small and medium enterprise
should be of particular interest to Europe, inas-
much as many of the large parcel-delivery com-
panies are headquartered in the United States. US
operators were much quicker and much more
effective to recognise and capitalise on the oppor-
tunities of e-commerce. Nevertheless, there is a
clear interest in ensuring that European firms,
which already face an uphill slog in many cases
because of small home markets and lack of brand
recognition, are not further disadvantaged by
incoherent European policy2. Based on Eurostat
and other statistics, “15 percent of SMEs sell
online compared with 35 percent of large enter-
prises; 7 percent of SMEs sell across borders com-
pared with 21 percent of large enterprises”3 .
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4. By NPOs we mean the his-
toric incumbent postal oper-
ators, generally the firms
that are subject to   univer-
sal service obligations; in
many member states,
however, parcel delivery is
not treated as a
universal service.
5. This effect would operate
through the price elasticity
of demand. It is sometimes
argued that the price that
the consumer pays to the
retail shipper is irrelevant
because retailers offer free
or discounted delivery. It is
indeed fair to assume that
the explicit delivery charge
that the consumer sees
does not necessarily bear
much of a relationship to
the (unknown) price paid by
the retailer to the delivery
service (see for instance
Okholm et al, 2016, pages
21-24.). This is however
rather beside the point. The
retailer will consider the true
costs of shipping goods
when it determines the
price of the goods sold.
6. To an economist, this can
be understood as a
deadweight loss, and can be
analysed using
Harberger’s Triangle.
7. The desire to obtain
these gains in trade is the
reason why countries seek
free trade agreements. 
8. It is sometimes argued
that goods are not necessar-
ily shipped from the country
associated with the website
(see Okholm et al, 2016,
page 11: “In fact, a large
share of online transactions
that are perceived as
domestic by consumers
involve a cross-border ele-
ment”). This is correct, and
reflects a beneficial cost
optimisation on the part of
the shipper, but is some-
what irrelevant to the
concern that fulfilment cen-
tres are not necessarily
placed where they would be
if the delivery were fully
reflective of cost.
1.2 What forms of cross-border parcel delivery
might be subject to high pricing?
In the case of express or courier services, the pres-
ence of multiple vertically integrated providers
makes it likely that their prices are competitive.
Most e-commerce does not travel this way, how-
ever, because these services tend to be too expen-
sive, and because not all shipments require such
rapid delivery (European Commission, 2013).
Large retailers are aware of and able to exploit
multiple parcel delivery channels (including self-
provision, especially in dense metropolitan areas
where their volume of shipments is high enough).
It can be safely assumed that the largest retailers
optimise their use of delivery services so that
each shipment is delivered from the most suitable
fulfilment centre, over the most suitable service.
They probably pay less for cross-border parcel
delivery than small-scale retailers and individu-
als. At the same time, it can be assumed that even
the largest retailers are dependent on the national
postal operators (NPOs4 to deliver to low density
areas. How much the large retailers are disadvan-
taged by cross-border parcel delivery prices is
simply not known.
Small retailers, especially micro-enterprises and
SMEs, probably have fewer alternatives to the
standard national postal operators (or they may
be less aware of them or may not trust them) (see
also section 3.3). Consumers and micro-enter-
prises will tend to pay the NPOs’ high published
prices. Small and medium enterprises may obtain
somewhat discounted prices (FTI, 2011), but how
large the volume of shipments must be to qualify
varies between member states, and what level
of discounts might be obtained is, as with
most aspects of this very opaque market
sector, unknown.
Alternative shippers exist, but they typically lack
the scale economies of the universal-service postal
services. Some may provide national coverage, but
others might prefer to ‘cherry pick’ high-density
areas where the economics are more favourable.
For low-density areas, a strong analogy to
telecommunications economics can be made. It
is typically only the historic national operator that
has both the obligation and also the scale
economies that enable and require it to provide
services. In dense urban areas, by contrast, com-
petition can be strong.
1.3  Why inflated prices matter
Inflated prices for cross-border delivery impact
Europe in many ways:
For B2C shipments, if the price of cross-border•
shipment is inflated, this price will ultimately
be paid by the consumer one way or another
and is likely to depress demand5. Purchases
that might have been made but were not
because of over-pricing6 represent a welfare
loss to European society.
Consumers might look only on domestic web-•
sites instead of checking websites in other
member states because they (rightly or
wrongly) fear high delivery charges. Analo-
gously, small senders might decline to offer
services in other member states because
they lack the knowledge or scale needed to
offer services there. In both cases, potential
gains in trade are foregone if a better or less
expensive product that could have been pur-
chased is not in fact purchased7.
European competitiveness is lost relative to•
the EU’s global competitors. That SMEs are
strongly impacted is particularly worrisome
given that Europe is to some extent seeking to
catch up with B2C providers elsewhere that
were quicker than European firms to capitalise
on e-commerce opportunities. European firms
seeking to achieve market entry in the face of
competition from global giants like Amazon
should not be needlessly hobbled by Europe’s
own postal pricing arrangements.
Senders might be obliged to warehouse•
goods at more locations than would have
been necessary if prices were more reflective
of underlying costs8. This again represents a
competitive disadvantage in comparison to
other regions of the world.
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9. BEREC/ERGP (2015),
page 14. They advance
other equally unpersuasive
arguments.
10. Laffont et al (1998a);
Laffont et al (1998b); and
Armstrong (1998).
11. Since the consumer’s
ISP receives retail revenue
(often at a flat rate), unlike
the network of the called
party, and since usage-
based costs tend to be low,
the wholesale payment is
not essential here.
12. See for instance
Okholm et al (2016),
pages 21-24.
2  telecoMMunicationS caSH flowS verSuS
Parcel delivery caSH flowS
A good starting point for an examination of the
economics of cross-border parcel delivery is the
well-understood economics of cross-border
telecommunications. These similarities seem
clear to us, but seem not to be obvious to the rel-
evant regulatory authorities. A 2015 joint report of
the Body of European Regulators for Electronic
Communications (BEREC) and the European Reg-
ulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP), for
instance, argued that “the contract for an interna-
tional roaming service is between the consumer
which originates a call/SMS or uses data and their
mobile service provider, [while] the contract for an
intra-EU cross-border parcels service is between
the online retailer or sender of the parcel and the
parcel delivery operator”9. In fact, the cash flows
for parcel delivery are similar to those of many
telecommunications applications, and are nearly
identical to those of Internet content delivery. 
It is easier to demonstrate this similarity in terms
of telecommunications interconnection than
in terms of the rather messy arrangements for
international mobile roaming. In the case of
telephony, the calling party pays for the call at a
retail rate. In most of the world, the receiving party
typically does not pay. The network that serves
the calling party (the originating network) makes
a payment at wholesale level to the network that
serves the receiving party (the terminating net-
work), which would otherwise receive no explicit
revenue for the call10.
This basic model was expanded in 2003 to deal
with Internet interconnection (Laffont et al, 2003).
Different Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are
assumed to serve websites and ‘eyeballs’
(consumers), respectively, thus taking an
approach broadly in line with subsequent analysis
of the economics of two-sided markets (Rochet
and Tirole, 2004). Here, the consumer who
receives content sometimes makes a direct
payment to the website (a micropayment). The
website and the consumer each make retail
payments to their respective ISPs. Payments
between the ISP that serves the website and the
ISP that serves the consumer were the main focus
Laffont et al (2003), although they are not very
common today11.
It should be obvious that the flow of payments
when goods are ordered for physical delivery by
the national postal operators (see Figure 3) is
much the same as the flow of payments when
services are ordered for delivery over the Internet,
except that the recipient of the parcel typically
does not pay the parcel service for receiving it
(similar to the telephony example in Figure 1);
rather, the payment flows to the retailer or sender
of the parcel. This payment plays precisely the
same role as a micropayment to a content web-
site (Figure 2). In fact, the sender in these two
examples might be the same firm – if one chooses
to order video content from, for example, Amazon,
one might choose between streaming video over
the Internet versus physical shipment of a DVD.
The amount paid will be different in the two cases,
but it is the same retail merchant, the same pay-
ment channel, and largely the same flow of pay-
ments (with ISPs taking the place of national
postal operators).
The literature on cross-border parcel delivery
rightly notes that many retailers do not explicitly
charge for domestic shipping12. It should however
be clear from Figure 3 that the aggregate payment
from consumer to retailer is what matters for most
purposes, not how the payment is structured. One
can reasonably assume that the retailer struc-
tures its retail prices in such a way that it
recuperates (on average) its costs, including the
cost of shipping.
For the most common postal (cross-border) serv-
ices, payments between postal operators are
referred to as terminal dues (TDs). Terminal dues are
relevant not only for letters, but also for small
parcels (less than 2 Kg) delivered as letter post.
Inward land rates (ILRs) are the wholesale pay-
ments between NPOs for heavier parcels of between
2kg and 20kg (up to 31kg in some countries).
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Originating 
network
Terminating
network
Calling par ty Called par ty
Retail payment Wholesale payment
Call is placed
figure 1: cash ﬂows for telephony interconnection
Source: Bruegel.
Website 
ISP
Consumer
ISP
Content website Consumer
Retail payment Wholesale payment (rare)
Delivery of content
Retail payment
Micropayment
figure 2: cash ﬂows for internet interconnection
Source: Bruegel.
NPO parcel
delivery sevice
NPO parcel
delivery sevice
Shipper ’s website Consumer
Retail payment Wholesale payment (TD or ILR)
Delivery of parcel
Retail payment
figure 3: cash ﬂows for parcel delivery
Source: Bruegel.
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3.2 Consumers and retailers are concerned about
cross-border delivery prices
From the perspective both of those that already
conduct e-commerce across borders, and those
that do not, there is no question that the cost of
cross-border parcel delivery is perceived as
a problem.
Eurostat (2015) conducted a comprehensive
survey of businesses in 2015. Among firms
already conducting e commerce on a cross-border
basis (or that did so in the past), 51 percent said
delivery prices were too high when selling to other
EU countries, and 27 percent said this was a “major
problem”. Among companies that did not sell
online to other EU countries but were trying to at
the time of the survey, 62 percent said that high
delivery costs were a problem, and 41 percent con-
sidered these costs a “major problem”. Of firms not
selling online, 57 percent said that delivery costs
were too high, and that this was a major problem.
Significantly, for all three groups, high delivery
costs were perceived as the most serious single
barrier to cross-border e-commerce.
3.3 Results from the literature
FTI Consulting (2011) attempted a comprehen-
sive assessment for the European Commission of
whether wholesale and retail parcel delivery
prices were inflated.
A first key finding was that:
“… market conditions are very different for large
and small senders. Large senders operate in a
competitive European cross-border parcels envi-
ronment, and have much choice and bargaining
power vis-a-vis suppliers. The prices they pay are
negotiated. By contrast, many small senders tend
to use the services of national postal operators,
even in cases where they do have alternatives. As
a result, they pay higher cross-border prices, as
compared to domestic ones. These higher prices
could be due to higher cross-border unit costs
linked to the smaller scale of cross-border opera-
tions; and/or to insufficient competitive pressure,
ie to the existence of market power.”
3   are croSS-Border Parcel delivery
retail PriceS inflated?
3.1  Domestic versus cross-border delivery
In assessing the costs of cross-border delivery, it
is important to bear in mind that the NPOs have sig-
nificant additional work to do for cross-border
delivery in comparison to domestic delivery. Some
of this extra work relates to the distance over which
the parcel has to be shipped, but much more of the
extra work relates to relabelling and otherwise
mapping one NPO’s services and processes to
those of another. These re-mapping costs are
largely unknown, but might be quite substantial.
This extra work means that it is legitimate for
cross-border prices to be somewhat higher than
domestic. The question is how much higher?
It is clear that cross-border delivery involves a
longer chain of operations than domestic delivery,
and therefore more cost. For domestic delivery,
the chain of operations can be conceptualised as
shown in Figure 4.
For cross-border delivery, the transport operation
is more extensive, and additional steps are
required (Figure 5); therefore, the cost to the deliv-
ery service is likely to be greater and it should
consequently be no surprise if the price is set
somewhat higher. Other factors could also con-
tribute to legitimately higher costs than for
domestic delivery, including different labour rates
or currency exchange fluctuations.
We also note that most NPOs offer either a single
retail price for parcel delivery to most of Europe,
or some other aggregation of prices. Consumers
generally appreciate the simplicity of these
arrangements. In comparing prices, however, this
can lead to counter-intuitive border effects – the
price of shipping a parcel to an adjacent country is
often much higher than the price for shipping the
same parcel to a more distant location in one’s
own country. These border-effect price differ-
ences should be viewed, other things being equal,
as legitimate.
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FTI (2011) concluded, after correcting for factors
that make cross-border delivery more costly than
domestic, that:
“… cross-border prices are indeed much higher
than domestic benchmark prices and therefore
too high. For parcels, they are on average twice as
high as domestic benchmark prices, while for
packets, which are part of letter mail, they are
about 30 percent higher.”
Claes and Vergote (2016) carried out another
econometric study for the European Commission
in late 2015. They found that “on average, cross-
border prices are 324 percent higher than their
domestic counterpart for letters and 471 percent
higher for parcels”. Based on our own assessment
(see section 3.4), the 471 percent may possibly
be too high.
It is worth noting that both of these studies, and
our own assessment as well (see section 3.4),
share the limitation that substantially all research
on postal retail and wholesale price characteris-
tics has been based on published list prices,
despite the lack of data on how many firms actu-
ally pay these prices, how different they are from
the discounted prices actually paid, and the actual
sources and destinations of parcels shipped.
Collection
transpor t
Primary sor tation Secondary sor tation
transpor t
Delivery oﬃce
transpor t
delivery
figure 4: Steps in domestic postal delivery
Source: FTI (2011).
Collection
transpor t
Primary sor tation Cross-border hub
transpor t
Delivery oﬃce
transpor t
delivery
Secondary sor tation Primary sor tation
transpor t transpor t
foreign border
figure 5: Steps in cross-border parcel delivery
Source: FTI (2011).
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13. All prices are based on
a review of NPO websites
during the first four months
of 2016.
14. For cross-border parcel
delivery, we looked at
prices for the countries
often referred to as ‘Zone 1’
(delivery within EU from
Germany and Greece). 
15. The finding is, however,
consistent with Claes and
Vergote (2016).
A first characteristic that is evident is that cross-
border rates are higher than domestic – from twice
as high to three times as high in the upper weight
categories in Germany, but an order of magnitude
higher in Greece.
A second and rather surprising characteristic is
that, while domestic prices are roughly linear as a
function of weight, cross-border prices show a def-
inite upwards tendency with increasing weight (ie
the second derivate is positive). This is not what
one would expect – if labour costs predominate,
then costs should be driven more by the number
of items than the weight, and the curve should
slope downwards, not upwards15.
The ratio between cross-border delivery prices and
the equivalent domestic prices (bearing in mind
however that the services are not perfectly equiv-
alent) differs greatly between Germany and
Greece, and is also a function of the weight of the
parcel (Figure 8). The difference is far smaller in
3.4 An assessment based on published retail
prices
It is clear based on underlying cost considerations
that retail prices for cross-border parcel delivery
should be higher than domestic, but how much
higher? 
This question has been explored several times by
means of econometric analysis, but a first order
review of retail prices in a range of member
states13 (even at some risk of over-simplification
of a complicated space) can provide a different
and complementary view.
Figures 6 and 7 show the price per kilogramme for
domestic and cross-border parcel delivery for a
large central European country, Germany and a
smaller peripheral one, Greece14. These two
member states have substantially different pub-
lished postal pricing arrangements.
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
45
 
1 2 5 10 20 25 30 31.5
Pr
ic
e
Domestic Zone 1
Kg
figure 6: the nPo’s published price in Germany
(€/kg)
Source: Bruegel.
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figure 7: the nPo’s published price in Greece
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Source: Bruegel.
figure 8: ratio of nPo european cross-border parcel delivery prices to equivalent domestic prices in
selected member states (by kg)
Source: Bruegel
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16. This is consistent with
an observation in FTI
(2011) that economic dis-
tortions are less significant
in the six largest member
states than in many others.
The coefficient of variation
in these six countries (ie
the standard deviation
divided by the mean, which
provides a normalised
measure of variability)
ranges as a function of
weight from 0.81 to 1.19,
which is quite large.
17. There are also
competitors that offer
nationwide parcel delivery
service, such as UPS.
18. We acknowledge that
there are limitations in
these comparisons. First,
there are challenges in
comparing services that are
not quite identical. Also,
some claim that US postal
prices are low by global
standards. Nonetheless,
the rough comparison is
close enough to enable
indicative comparisons.
19. Zones (reflecting
distance from the sender)
in the US range from 1
through 5.
20. We generally use prices
to Zone 1, subject however
to the caveat that Zone 1 is
defined differently in each
member state.
21. Based on €/$ exchange
rates as of the the first week
of May 2016.
Austria, France, Germany and Spain than in Greece
or Cyprus16.
A comparison with parcel delivery prices in the
United States is also instructive. The United States
is not hugely different from the European Union as
a whole in terms of population, area and GDP per
capita, but it is a single federal republic that has
had a single national postal service since it was
founded17. Prices for parcel delivery within the
United States thus serve as something of a bench-
mark of what one might expect if European postal
service prices were a true reflection of underlying
costs, and in the absence of the transaction costs
imposed by re-mapping of services from those of
the sending NPO to those of the receiving NPO18.
US prices for domestic delivery of ‘machinable’
parcels (ie parcels with fairly standard dimensions
and falling within prescribed weight limits) show a
fairly smooth curve within each weight category
from zone 1 (closest to sender) to zone 5 (furthest
from the sender)19. This is very different from
Europe, where prices jump sharply when the first
national border is crossed. 
It is instructive to note that published United
States Postal Service (USPS) prices include dis-
counts for various forms of bulk mail, including for
instance a rate for “periodicals and standard mail
that is properly prepared and entered by the
mailer at the [post office, station or branch] that
serves the delivery address on the mail”, and also
discounted rates for mail delivered in bulk to a
post office that is pre-sorted based either on the
first three digits or five digits of the postal zip code.
The details are somewhat byzantine, but it is strik-
ing that discounted arrangements are published
and consistent across the United States.
It is difficult to make valid US-EU comparisons
because the services are not exactly like for like,
and for many other reasons; however, Figure 10
attempts a rough comparison. Each of the six
panels shows selected EU member states in
ascending order by the domestic price for a 1kg
parcel. The left-hand panels show the NPO’s pub-
lished price for domestic delivery within each of
the selected member states for different parcel
weight categories; the right-hand panels show
each NPO’s published cross-border price for deliv-
ery to other member states (either to those that
are nearby, or to all EU member states)20.
For comparison, we also show in each panel
the most nearly comparable US Postal Service
(USPS) price.
Figure 10 shows that domestic EU prices appear
to be somewhat comparable to US prices for short
distances, but with a wide range of variation
depending on the member state. For 1kg parcels
(and noting that that parcels of up to 2 Kg may rep-
resent as much as 90 percent of all parcels), rela-
tively low domestic parcel delivery prices are
found in countries that have low labour costs (such
as Greece and Cyprus), and also in some of the
larger economies such as Germany (presumably
thanks to economies of scale). For 1 Kg parcels,
the published price for domestic delivery in Greece
is 34 percent of the comparable USPS price, while
prices in Italy and in the UK are 221 percent and
346 percent, respectively, of the US price21.
For cross-border prices, the spread is far greater,
and all EU prices are higher than the correspon-
ding US benchmark –some are much higher. The
published price in Germany for cross-border deliv-
ery of a 1 Kg parcel is 1.43 times greater than the
US benchmark comparison price. Published prices
in other member states are at least twice the US
comparison price. Published prices in Spain, Italy
and the UK are respectively as much as 4.71, 6.27
0
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30
35
40
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figure 9: uSPS price (in $) for domestic parcel
delivery to zones 1 (closest) to 5 (furthest), by
weight (kg)
Source: Bruegel.
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and 6.02 times as great. By any measure, these
are large differences. 
4   are croSS-Border Parcel delivery
wHoleSale PriceS ProBleMatic?
Rather little has been written about wholesale
payments between postal providers. There is an
intriguing, though small, literature on the eco-
nomics of postal cross-border wholesale pay-
ments (see sections 4.2 and 4.3).
22. See for
instance Marcus and
Petropoulos (2016);
Imme Philbeck et al (2012);
and Marcus et al (2015).
23. See
Laffont et al (1998a);
Laffont et al (1998b);
and Laffont et al (2003).
24. The original Regulation
was ‘Regulation (EC) No
717/2007 of the European
Parliament and of The Coun-
cil of 27 June 2007 on
roaming on public mobile
telephone networks within
the Community and amend-
ing Directive 2002/21/EC’. It
was amended in 2009,
2012, and most recently
with Regulation
2015/2120. With interna-
tional mobile roaming, a
mobile phone subscriber
places or receives calls or
SMS messages or uses
mobile data services in a
country other than the
country in which he or she
has his subscription.
25. Prior to regulation in
2007, wholesale charges
were roughly €1.00 per
minute for calls made, and
retail prices roughly €1.30
per minute (Stumpf, 2001).
4.1 What one might have expected based on
experience with roaming
The economics of international mobile roaming22
and the related economics of telecommunications
interconnection23 provide useful insights relevant
to the postal sector. Prior to the Roaming Regula-
tion of 200724, (1) wholesale charges25 were
greatly in excess of real wholesale costs (repre-
senting a huge profit for the visited network); (2)
these wholesale charges effectively set a floor for
the retail price, since they represented a real cost
figure 10: comparison of eu domestic and cross-border published retail prices to roughly
comparable uS postal service published prices (2016, uSd)
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to the network that provided the retail service (ie
the home network); and (3) retail mark-ups over
the wholesale charge that have tended to be in the
range of 30 percent, both before and after regula-
tion, compounded the problem of high prices
because they were effectively in addition to the
already high wholesale charge (Figure 11).
It would be natural to assume that the same
should hold for cross-border parcel delivery, and
some of the literature makes this assumption. For
instance, FTI (2011) assumed that excessive
wholesale payments (TD rates) contributed to high
retail prices. Surprisingly, this seems not to be the
case. Instead, as we have shown, wholesale TD
rates seem to be not too high, but rather too low.
Given that the structure of payments in the two
cross-border activities is roughly the same, it is
surprising that the outcomes should be opposite.
The difference appears to be linked to the fact that
NPOs are under no obligation (thanks to UPU rules)
to make their services available to domestic com-
petitors, nor to foreign competitors who are not
NPOs. There is a de-facto geographic partitioning26.
4.2 Wholesale TD prices appear to be not too
high, but rather too low
The structure of TD and ILR wholesale prices is
documented by the UPU, but specific rates do not
appear to be publicly visible anywhere. Despite
the dearth of publicly available information, there
is nonetheless good reason to believe that TDs are
below a reasonable estimate of NPOs’ marginal
costs. ILRs have been less studied, and in any
case represent a relatively small fraction of total
parcel volume, so we say little about them here.
As a threshold question, one needs to consider
what the appropriate price should be. The TD
should presumably cover the costs of delivery,
but not of collection, in the destination country.
(For international traffic, collection is performed in
the sending country, not in the destination coun-
try). The UPU generally assumes that 70 percent
of the domestic postal rate is a reasonable proxy
for the cost of delivery, which seems fairly rea-
sonable. We follow their practice here.
There are signposts that TDs are not too high, but
rather too low, in:
The limited literature on this complex topic;•
The presence of a remailing industry, and the•
need to use UPU rules to suppress it; 
Periodic complaints that foreign senders (eg•
from China) can ship goods to Europe for less
than European firms.
First, the literature definitely leans in the direction
of TDs being too low. Even at the time of the Com-
mission’s 1987 Postal Green Paper (European
Commission, 1987), it was already recognised
that “most member states find that their unit costs
for delivering [inward cross-border] traffic are not
covered”.
James R. Campbell Jr. has tackled the question in
numerous studie27. He argues consistently and
persuasively that TDs are set well below the nom-
inal cost benchmark of 70 percent of the equiva-
lent domestic price (EDP).
Two studies by Copenhagen Economics on behalf
of the US Postal Regulatory Commission (US PRC)
explain the TD system and attempt to estimate the
adverse impact on societal welfare that flows from
non-cost-based TDs. They found that “terminal
dues received often are lower than the prices for
last-mile handling of domestic (and comparable)
letter post items in the receiving country” (Okholm
et al, 2014 and 2015).
26. The difference might
also reflect the preferences
of developing countries,
who represent the majority
of UPU members, and might
moreover reflect the fact
that in the distant past,
there were no charges at all.
27. See for instance Camp-
bell (2014a) and especially
Campbell (2014b).
Euro
Retail
Price
True wholesale cost
Wholesale
Charge
figure 11: relationship between wholesale cost,
wholesale charges, and retail price for mobile
roaming
Source: Bruegel.
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28. An analogous form of
arbitrage came into play in
conjunction with the low
value consignment rule
exemption from VAT, under
which magazines were
printed in Denmark, then
shipped to the Åland
Islands (Finland) and
shipped back to Denmark in
order to avoid paying
Danish VAT.
29. See for instance Guo
(2014) and Steiner (2016).
The issue is by no means
confined to the
United States.
The second clue to below-cost TDs is the presence
of a remailing industry, and the need for the UPU
to implement rules to hinder it. Remailing has
been around for a long time. The European Com-
mission’s 1987 Postal Green Paper defined remail-
ing as “a cross-border mail service offered by
private operators in competition with the services
offered by the postal administration in the coun-
try of the customer. … [One] type of remail
involves mail being transported from country A to
country B for remailing back to country A”.
Economic distortions must be present if it is cost-
effective to deliver a parcel from country A to
country A (in effect a domestic delivery) by ship-
ping it outside the country and then shipping it
back. This can only be profitable if the interna-
tional charge for inward traffic is less than the
internal cost. Examples of this kind of arbitrage are
well known in the world of telecommunications
(where it is known as ‘tromboning’, and occurs
only when international termination rates are less
than domestic termination rates and/or on-net ter-
mination costs)28.
Complaints that Chinese senders can ship goods
to developed countries at lower cost than mer-
chants within the respective countries are an
additional indicator, and a confirmation that this
is not merely a historical curiosity29. Again, this
could only be the case if TDs are artificially
depressed.
4.3 Implications for retail services of low TD
wholesale payments
To the extent that these TD wholesale payments
might tend to be below relevant marginal costs,
the implications for retail prices are profound.
Recall that:
FTI (2011) found that published prices for•
cross-border parcel delivery “are on average
twice as high as domestic benchmark prices”,
while Claes and Vergote (2016) found that “on
average, cross-border prices are … 471 per-
cent higher [than their domestic equivalents]
for parcels” (see section 3.3).
The cost that the sending network operator•
incurs for delivery, which would normally be
expected to be on the order of 70 percent of
the domestic price, is even less in this case
because the TDs are depressed thanks to UPU
rules (see again section 3.3).
In terms of retail prices paid by individual con-
sumers, this leads inescapably to the conclusion
that the mark-up for those who are obliged to pur-
chase at published prices must be very high.
Figure 12 depicts this. The left column represents
the published retail price that consumers pay to
ship a parcel domestically. The actual cost of deliv-
ery is assumed, consistent with UPU assumptions,
to be 70 percent of the published domestic price.
For inward parcels, this same cost is assumed. The
lower dashed line can thus be viewed as repre-
senting the true cost of delivery, which is the cost
that the TDs are presumably meant to cover. Note
that this cost is incurred by a different postal serv-
ice, and in a different country, than the postal serv-
ice that receives the retail revenue.
The middle column of Figure 12 depicts both the
wholesale payment that the sending postal oper-
ator makes to the receiving postal operator (the
red rectangle), and the total retail revenue that the
sending postal service receives (the height of the
blue column). The retail revenue at published
prices is at least twice as great as in the case of
domestic parcel delivery. On the other hand, the
height of the red rectangle is actually less than the
cost of delivery to the receiving postal service.
Cross-border
Published
Retail
Price
Wholesale
Charge
Domestic
Retail
Price
Unknown
Large
Shipper
Price
Wholesale
Charge
Euro
Publishedﬃ
cross-border price
isﬃabout twice the
domestic retail price
Delivery cost isﬃ
about 70% of the
domestic retail price
figure 12: relationship between wholesale cost,
wholesale charges and published retail price for
parcel delivery by an nPo
Source: Bruegel.
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The difference between the height of the blue
column and that of the red column is then a meas-
ure of the postal service’s profit (ie the mark-up of
retail over wholesale). One must however bear in
mind that the wholesale TD payment is not the
only cost that the sending postal service incurs.
In addition to the adaptation and labelling costs,
there is also the transit of the parcel to the desti-
nation country, and probably also an additional
sortation step. It is quite unlikely that these costs
fully account for the wholesale-retail mark-up, but
they should not be ignored.
If the retail published price for cross-border deliv-
ery is twice as much as for domestic delivery, but
the cost to the sending postal service is less than
it would have incurred to deliver the parcel itself
domestically, then it would appear that the differ-
ence or ‘spread’ between price and cost is
(assuming that other costs such as transaction
costs and transit are not too great) far greater than
for domestic parcel delivery.
The right column of Figure 12 depicts the situation
for large senders. The wholesale cost to the receiv-
ing postal service is presumably largely inde-
pendent of whether the original sender was large
or small, and the TDs paid are likewise unlikely to
depend on who the original sender was; however,
the retail price will tend to be lower, and therefore
the mark-up of retail over the wholesale TD will
also be correspondingly lower. How much lower?
Amazingly little is publicly known about this.
5  SiMilaritieS and differenceS coMPared
to international MoBile roaMinG
There are significant similarities, but also note-
worthy differences, when it comes to prices for
parcel delivery and international mobile roaming.
Among the similarities:
Because of the cross-border nature of the•
service, and the fact that it is offered in two
different countries, prices lack transparency
and tend to be high.
That retail markets in the countries in ques-•
tion may be competitive has little or nothing
to do with whether these cross-border serv-
ices are over-priced.
The linkage between wholesale and retail•
prices is crucial in understanding any price
distortions, and also in understanding the
likely impact of any regulatory intervention.
Prior to regulation, hardly anything is publicly•
known about wholesale prices.
National regulatory authorities are limited in•
both their ability and their level of interest in
addressing the problem.
Every interaction involves two countries,•
but each lacks both authority and infor-
mation about the problem in the other
country.
No national regulatory authority has an•
incentive to take action that harms the
domestic incumbent in order to benefit
residents of another country.
Member states and NPOs that are net•
exporters (and thus net payers) may have
incentives that are very different from those
that are net importers of traffic.
For telecommunications, action at European•
level has been highly effective.
Here the similarities end. For roaming, high pric-
ing was largely the result of high wholesale prices
between the mobile network operators (MNOs),
which were exacerbated by significant additional
high mark-ups above the level of the wholesale
payment30. Regulatory price caps on both whole-
sale and retail prices proved to be effective.
For cross-border parcel delivery, if wholesale
prices are indeed too low rather than too high,
there are implications for what kind of regulatory
solutions might work, and what kind might not. If
the diagnosis is different than for roaming, the
cure is also likely to be different.
For cross-border parcel delivery, if one accepts
that there is a problem, it lies not with the absolute
level of wholesale charges, but rather with the
very large ‘spread’ between the retail price
charged to individuals and micro-enterprises
versus the low level of TD wholesale payments
(see Figure 12).
One could consider regulatory measures to
reduce this spread. If a direct regulatory interven-
tion were to be deemed necessary at some point
30. The combined effect of
taking mark-ups on both
vertically related services is
referred to as ‘double mar-
ginalisation’ or ‘pancaking’.
14
Br u eGe l
POLICY
contriBution
e-coMMerce in euroPe: Parcel delivery PriceS in a diGital SinGle Market
(on which we do not venture an opinion), an obvi-
ous candidate would be to make the TD wholesale
price arrangements available for the first time to
delivery services other than NPOs. If multiple
delivery services could utilise the NPOs’ delivery
networks at prices that were non-discriminatory
relative to those that the NPO provides itself, the
spread should in principle fall to levels consistent
with competitive forces.
The obvious risk in any strategy along these lines
is that, if done without a simultaneous correspon-
ding adjustment to the (currently below nominal
cost) TD rates, it would be likely to lead to quite
massive arbitrage. Each NPO’s competitors would
have access to the NPO’s delivery network at a
price that is in some sense below the cost of that
service to the NPO itself, and could therefore beat
the NPO on price even when using the NPO’s own
network to deliver.
The implication is clear. Any attempt to correct the
spread would need to address the apparent sys-
tematic under-pricing of wholesale TDs. Doing so
is unlikely to succeed without a better under-
standing of economic flows among the NPOs,
which implies a strong need for a greatly improved
base of statistics31.
6  recoMMendationS
A clear and unavoidable first step in our judgment
is to gather, at long last, real data on the problem.
Today, hardly anything is known, either to the
public or to national and European regulatory
authorities, about: 1) actual wholesale payments
made among national postal operators; or 2)
effective prices paid by senders other than indi-
vidual consumers.
The position of EU authorities in this regard is not
very different from that of EU and national regula-
tory authorities of electronic communications
before enactment of the 2007 EU Roaming Regu-
lation of 2007. No systematic data was available
then either. A fundamentally European problem
had been analysed, to the extent that it was
analysed at all, in a fragmented way at national
level. In this regard, the statistics collection that
has been conducted by European telecommuni-
cations regulators is a model that the postal sector
could adopt (see for instance BEREC, 2016).
Many options are available for European policy on
cross-border parcel delivery, but good statistics
at both wholesale and retail level are critical for all
of them:
European and national regulators need good•
statistics to forecast and evaluate the
impacts of any measures.
If the intent is to drive prices down through•
greater transparency, then statistics are obvi-
ously central to the effort.
If one were to attempt a ‘hard’ regulatory solu-•
tion, statistics are even more crucial in order
to understand and prevent harmful forms of
arbitrage that might result (see section 5).
A 2015 joint report of the Body of European Regu-
lators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and
the European Regulators Group for Postal Services
(ERGP) rightly noted that not all European postal
regulatory authorities have statutory authority to
collect data on retail prices. They therefore sug-
gested that the European Commission might
“define a clear statistical framework” and “provide
a legal basis to enable [national regulatory
authorities] to collect relevant market data on
domestic and cross-border parcel flows from all
postal service providers and/or other providers
being active on the B2C and Business-To-Busi-
ness (B2B) parcel markets …”.
However, this recommendation does not go far
enough. Merely empowering national postal reg-
ulatory authorities to collect such data will with
high probability lead to:
Collection of data by only a handful of postal•
authorities, if that;
Inconsistent data collection, and thus limited•
ability to compare data; and 
No empowerment of any central authority•
that can gather the data from the individual
postal authorities and analyse it.
We strongly recommend that member states be
not only empowered, but also required, to collect
data on retail and wholesale arrangements32. The
31. It is conceivable that the
NPOs would be forced to
respond by raising TDs
among themselves, and
that everything would func-
tion effortlessly; however,
given the complex inter-
linked structures in the
sector, it seems risky to
assume that everything
would function flawlessly
without intervention at the
present level of knowledge.
32. This is consistent with
the recommendations of FTI
(2011): “The fact that little
is disclosed about termina-
tion rates, so that [national
regulatory authorities] may
not be privy of them, is a
clear problem for efficient
regulation. We are not advo-
cating that termination
rates for USO deliveries
should be public. They
should not. They should,
however, be disclosed to
NRAs to allow them to
discharge their regulatory
duties …”.
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data should be in a consistent, pre-agreed format.
An authority other than the postal regulatory
authorities, presumably the European Commis-
sion, should oversee the standards developed in
order to ensure that the data reported is likely to
actually convey useful information about whole-
sale and retail arrangements between the national
postal operators. Some central authority with suf-
ficient independence and authority (presumably
the Commission) should gather the data from
national authorities, analyse it, and provide sum-
mary public reports33.
33. Confidentiality of com-
mercially sensitive data of
the designated operators
poses serious challenges.
BEREC’s data collection
solves this problem by
reporting summary statis-
tics at national level. Since
nearly all member states
have either three or four
MNOs, this does not unam-
biguously reveal informa-
tion about individual firms.
Since member states gener-
ally have only a single NPO,
some refinement would be
needed if the data is to be
made public.
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